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Abstract
European Union (EU)-based Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are usually pictured as well-established professionalized
actors basing their advocacy strategies on the provision of expertise. Does the focus on expertise imply the removal of
emotions and feelings from political communication? Following the emotion turn in social movement and collective ac-
tion studies, this article investigates how and why EU-based CSOs use emotions in their advocacy strategies. The article
shows first how CSOs use rhetorical appeals to emotions and rhetorical appeals to reason in their communication. Sec-
ondly, the focus is directed to emotion-inspired advocacy strategies, namely blaming and shaming, fear-mongering and
boosting. The choice of rhetorical appeals and strategies is mainly explained by three different inter-related factors: the
logics of influence, the logics of membership and media logics. Empirical data is drawn from a content analysis of press
releases and policy documents of environmental (climate change) and human rights (refugee crisis) CSOs active at the EU
level and from semi-structured interviews with key CSO representatives.
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1. Introduction
Do Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) act from the heart
or from the head? After the end of the 1960s, emo-
tions tended to play almost no role in the understand-
ing of social movements and collective action, since ra-
tional, structural and organizational models dominated
political analysis (Calhoun, 2001; Goodwin, Jasper, &
Poletta, 2001). Since a few years, it may be the turn
of social movements and emotions (Collins, 2001). Emo-
tions have indeed attracted increasing scholarly atten-
tion in the 2000s, even if they have not deeply trans-
formed the understanding of sociological and political
theory (Calhoun, 2001).
Despite this increasing interest, many sub-disciplines
within the field of political science, such as European
studies or interest groups research, have not dedicated
much attention to the role of emotions. Emotions are a
key factor to ensure consent and social conformity and
as such, they could help to address central questions in
interest-group research in the European context, such as
the democratic deficit and the legitimacy gap. Regarding
the particular topic of CSOs in the European Union (EU),
the emphasis has been placed on their expertise, their
consensus-seeking strategies and their professionalism,
and thus, little attention has been given to the role that
emotions might have played in their advocacy strategies.
A better understanding of the role of emotions can help
explain howCSOs engage in dynamics of justification and
persuasion. This article also constitutes an interesting ad-
dition to current literature on framing processes. Cur-
rent research on framing tends to focus on the cognitive
and normative aspects and there is considerably less re-
search about the interaction between framing processes
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and emotions (Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004; Lecheler, Bos,
& Vliegenthart, 2015).
To contribute to the development of knowledge on
the role of emotions in advocacy activities, the present
article answers the following research question: how do
EU-based CSOs use emotions in their advocacy strate-
gies? This question is further developed in the follow-
ing sub-questions: To what extent do EU-based CSOs use
rhetoric appeals to reason and rhetoric appeals to emo-
tion in their political communication? If CSOs use appeals
to emotions, how do they use them and why do they use
them within the framework of different strategies?
This article first briefly introduces the study of emo-
tions in social movement research. Secondly, I provide
a preliminary analytical framework to study the use of
emotions by CSOs and I discuss themethodology and the
data collected. The empirical part applies the proposed
framework. It shows how andwhy the analyzed CSOs use
appeals to reason and emotions in their political commu-
nication and to which extent these CSOs use emotions in
advocacy strategies including examples such as blaming
and shaming, fear mongering and boosting.
2. Studying the Role of Emotions in EU-Based CSOs’
Advocacy
This section introduces first the main concepts used in
this article, namely CSOs and emotions, and discusses
very briefly the study of emotions in social movements
and collective action research. I also provide a prelimi-
nary analytical framework to study the use of emotions
by CSOs in their communication and advocacy strategies.
2.1. CSOs, Emotions and the Study of Collective Action
Both the concept of CSOs and emotion are highly con-
tested. Regarding CSOs, I opt for a definition that focuses
on their public purpose (Sanchez Salgado, 2014). CSOs
stand out for their normative dimension since they sup-
port values such as equality, justice and solidarity (Cohen
& Arato, 1992). This definition differs from a broad con-
ception of CSOs including economic and professional or-
ganizations and from a strict interpretation of CSOs as
exclusively voluntary groups (Jordan, Halpin, & Maloney,
2004). CSOs analyzed also include organizations funded
by public institutions, collective structures or organiza-
tions of organizations even when they cannot be consid-
ered as traditional voluntary groups.
Regarding emotions, I apply in this article a flexible
and inclusive definition. Emotions can originate fromcog-
nitive judgments or can be non-conscious responses to
bodily states (or a combination of both). The study of
emotions differs from the study of the role of values or
ideas in the sense that emotions are primed response
structures that intervene automatically during the pro-
cess of adaptation (Popa & Salanţă, 2013).
While studying emotions, disciplines such as political
science and sociology tend to emphasize the cognitive di-
mension (hypercognitivism). As a complement, my anal-
ysis also includes the possibility that emotions may be
pre-conscious or even unconscious, since there is suffi-
cient scientific evidence to at least contemplate this pos-
sibility (Arias Maldonado, 2016; Damasio, 1999). While
the nature of interactions between emotions and cogni-
tion (or ‘rationality’) remains unclear, there seems to be
an emerging consensus that the traditional assumption
that there is a sharp distinction between emotions and
cognition needs to be revisited (as Prior and Van Hoef
state in this issue’s editorial). It is also agreed that emo-
tions do not have necessarily a negative impact on ra-
tional or reasonable decision-making. The way emotions
are experienced depends in any case on culture, social
class and context.
The study of emotions has increasingly attracted
the attention of political scientists (Berezin, 2002;
McDermott, 2004; Thompson & Hoggett, 2012). As may
be expected, one of the most prolific subfields is po-
litical psychology (Marcus, Mackuen, & Neuman, 2011;
Redlawsk, 2006). Another prolific subfield more directly
related to the present study is social movements and
collective action (Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005; Goodwin
et al., 2001; Jasper, 2011). Existing research shows how
emotions can help in understanding political behavior in
elections andpolitical campaigning, decision-making pro-
cesses, risk assessment and political involvement.
Existing studies on the role of emotions in collective
action and social movements research have been crit-
icized for relying too much on a substantialist concep-
tion of emotions, for approaching emotions from a lim-
ited number of theoretical perspectives and for assum-
ing the emotional neutrality of established institutions
(Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005). Most current research in-
deed conceives emotions as if they were attributes of in-
dividuals, at the same level as beliefs, cognitions or inter-
ests. Emotional appeals are considered to be very pow-
erful in getting people involved in protest against certain
policies or political action against injustices. Emotions
are thus usually associated with specific outcomes of col-
lective action. To illustrate with an example, the ability to
express anger is considered to be a means to challenge
injustices (Jasper, 2011).
Much less has been written about collective emo-
tions (Von Scheve & Salmela, 2014). Groups can be con-
sidered to have emotions when individuals identify with
the group (Schmid, 2014) or when there is a joint commit-
ment to the group as a body (Gilbert, 2014).While organi-
zations do not have a body and thus, they do not feel as in-
dividuals do, emotions are visible in marketing and inter-
nal management strategies (Hochschild, 1983) or more
interestingly for this article, in political communication.
The institutional role of emotions at the empirical level
is also currently underdeveloped in the political field of
inquiry. Hochschild’s (1983) research showing the signifi-
cant role of feeling rules in the corporate world continues
to be relevant today, but to my knowledge, it has rarely
been applied to the study of collective action or politics.
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2.2. Emotions and EU-Based CSOs Strategies: Analytical
Framework
In this empirical part, I propose first an analytical frame-
work for the descriptive analysis of CSOs’ appeals to emo-
tions, and I offer some elements of explanation to help
understanding why CSOsmay be using such appeals. Sec-
ond, I establish a link between CSOs’ appeals to emotion
and their advocacy strategies, illustrating these linkswith
a few examples of emotion-based advocacy strategies.
Rhetorical analysis can help with the operationaliza-
tion of the study of political communication, making
the study of emotions concrete by proposing the study
of political arguments as they take place ‘in the wild’
(Finlayson, 2007, p. 552). Rhetoric is often understood as
‘persuasive communicationsmade in contingent and con-
flictual civic contexts’ (Finlayson, 2007, p. 545). Rhetoric
is here conceived more broadly, not only as a means of
persuasion (merely instrumental), but as fully part of the
process of coming to believe something.
Do CSOs use rhetoric appeals to reason or rhetoric
appeals to emotion, and if so, why? The distinction be-
tween appeals to reason and appeals to emotion differs
from the classical distinction between appeals to logos,
pathos and ethos. Appeals based on logical justification
(logos) often (if not always) include emotional or affec-
tive elements. Appeals to ethos (character of speaker)
can be both related to reason (when they invoke exper-
tise, formal qualifications or experience) and to emo-
tions, when they involve charisma or affect for a leader.
In mainstream research on collective action, the duality
between emotion and reason has persisted in more or
less subtle ways. Just to give an example, while analyz-
ing CSOs strategies, it is commonly considered that pro-
fessionalized CSOs focus on expertise provision and so-
cialmovements and grassroots groups on contentious ac-
tion. This could be interpreted as a distinction between a
fewprofessionalized CSOs basing their arguments on rea-
son and a group of contentious social movements basing
their action on emotions.
In the absence of emotions, CSOs would only pub-
lish formal and unemotional documents characterized by
lack of style, literary tropes or word play with the aim to
confer to these publications clarity and a certain gravitas
(Finlayson, 2007). This style is usually employed by gov-
ernment and civil servants to confer certain objectivity
to their work. In these cases, normative and affective el-
ements may remain, but in a blurred and implicit way.
The idea of objectivity and commitment to the better ar-
gument has been criticized for ignoring the reality of po-
litical communication in the current conflictual, power-
laden and inegalitarian context (Bickford, 2011).
Using emotions in political communication can also
be considered as part of policy framing, which can be
seen as a strategic choice or/and as a result of constraints
derived from group characteristics or contextual charac-
teristics (Klüver, Mahoney, & Opper, 2015). The present
article will help to understand the pressures CSOs face
while selecting specific frames. This is an interesting con-
tribution to existing research in political communication
that places the emphasis on how framing affects individ-
uals. While it has been shown that framing has impor-
tant effects on emotions and that emotions play an im-
portant mediating role (Lecheler et al., 2015), not much
is known about the constitutive role that emotions may
play in framing dynamics.
Political actors such as CSOs indeed enter into a
specific structure of communication that must satisfy
certain conventions and institutional codes (Finlayson,
2007). Regarding CSOs, these conventions and institu-
tional codesmay come frompolitical institutions, namely
government (logic of influence), their members (logic of
membership) or from the news media (media logic). The
logic of influence requires that interest groups choose
frames that allow them to have influence on decision
makers (Schmitter & Streeck, 1981). It implies that inter-
est groups adapt their communication strategies to the
particular preferences and beliefs of policy makers. Pre-
vious research has shown that EU-based interest groups
tend to focus on expertise provision and consensus-
building strategies (Sanchez Salgado, 2014). Previous re-
search has also shown that public frames are more used
when addressing EU departments that deal with public
goods giving some credit to the logic of influence (Klüver
et al., 2015).
The logic of membership demands from interest
groups that they behave in accordance with their con-
stituency (Schmitter & Streeck, 1981). Public interest
groups such as CSOs are more pressured to become
known by the public in order to obtain resources from
members and supporters. Previous research has con-
firmed that CSOs tend to stick to public frames following
the logic of membership (Klüver et al., 2015).
The media logic (Altheide & Snow, 1979) leads to a
process of mediatization introducing changes in the cri-
teria and rationalities following which interest groups de-
cide upon and act (Brändli, Donges, & Jentges, 2011).
Previous research has shown that interest groups re-
spond and adapt to the media logics with structural
changes, but not to the expected extent since the above-
mentioned logics (membership and influence) also play
a relevant role.
Regarding the logic of influence, one would expect
that professionalized EU-based CSOs use few appeals to
emotion. The European Commission promotes a type
of lobbying that is based on information and expertise
provision where there seems to be little space for emo-
tional displays. However, following the logic of member-
ship, CSOs may appeal to emotions to promote engage-
ment or mobilization of their members. Radical and con-
tentious repertoires of action (often based on symbols
and emotions) are frequently used to strengthen moti-
vations among protestors and to develop feelings of soli-
darity and belonging (Della Porta & Caiani, 2009). There
are also several reasons why one should expect that
media logic promotes rhetorical appeals to emotions in
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advocacy strategies. News reporting is often related to
a few bias including personalization and dramatization
(Bennett, 2016). Personalization refers to the framing of
stories in terms of human interests, which usually in-
cludes an emotional angle. Dramatization includes the fo-
cus on conflict and negative emotions. Providing drama
is usually considered by interest groups as a way to get
access to themedia and for CSOs this often consists of or-
ganizing pseudo-events to provide dramatic visuals and
symbolism (Thrall, 2006).
If CSOs use appeals to emotions, how and why do
they use them within the framework of different advo-
cacy strategies? Existing studies on lobbying and advo-
cacy strategies have so far proposed several classifica-
tions such as the inside/outside strategies model where
the role of emotions remains implicit or absent. They
rarely focus on emotions with the remarkable exception
of blaming and shaming (Kapyla & Kennedy, 2014). In
the following section, I show that appeals to emotions
can be directly related to advocacy strategies. On the ba-
sis of the empirical material collected for this research,
the appeals that seemed to be the most relevant for
CSOs advocacy strategies were appeals to shame, ap-
peals to fear and appeals to hope andpride. The emotion-
based strategies analyzed in this article are not exhaus-
tive but they provide a first overview of how appeals
to emotions can be used within the framework of advo-
cacy strategies.
Compassion filtered through anger is likely to take
the form of blaming and shaming or of a public accu-
sation (Kapyla & Kennedy, 2014). Blaming and shaming
consists of appealing to guilt or shame to generate a de-
sired action. While blaming and shaming has often con-
tributed to short-term victories for CSOs (Franklin, 2008),
it is also considered that they can hold back CSOs by
alienating them from potential allies or be used strate-
gically by policy makers (Van Erp, 2008). There is not
much research about how CSOs use fear in their advo-
cacy strategies. The so-called fear-mongering strategy is
mostly attributed to journalists and politicians. Fearmon-
gers deploy fear through narrative techniques to nor-
malize errors in reasoning, for example through repeti-
tion, through the presentation of isolated occurrences as
trends and through misdirection (Glassner, 2004). Last
but not least, appeals to hope and pride can be re-
lated to boosting. Boosting is an advocacy or lobbying
strategy consisting of using media work to enhance the
general public’s impression of particular policy makers
with the purpose of maintaining good relationships with
the latter (Trapp & Laursen, 2017). Within this strategy,
CSOs would produce positive content regarding politi-
cians’ public image.
2.3. Methodology and Data Collection and Analysis
The present article focuses on EU-based CSOs activities
in two domains: migration policy (issue of refugee crisis)
and environmental policy (issue of climate change). The
inclusion of two different policy areas permits to show if
there is variation across issues. These policy areas and is-
sues were selected because CSOs have well-established
advocacy strategies. Emotions tend to be prominent in
both policy areas at the European level, but the presence
of emotions in both fields tends to be average, and thus,
they can be studied as typical cases. The next sections
provide specific information about the corpus of argu-
ments that are going to be analyzed and the context of
relations in which they take place.
Regarding the corpus, this analysis covers a total of
267 press releases and short policy documents published
online by six well-established EU-based CSOs working
on the two topics under analysis (climate change and
refugee crisis)1 from 2014 to 2017 (see Table 1). The
number of documents and timing varies depending on
the data availability on each of thewebsites. The content
analysis also covers the last 50 Facebook statuses from
every CSO under analysis (year 2017). The Facebook sta-
tuses covered all types of issues and not only the ones
mentioned above. All data were published in English
and analyzed with the qualitative data analysis software
Atlas.ti. For the Atlas.ti content analysis I used descrip-
tive markers and automatic coding. First, I read all the
documents to identify empirically what could be seen as
cognition markers, including words such as statistics, sur-
vey, reason or research. Emotion markers included only
words referring directly to basic emotions such as fear,
compassion and shame. I did not use emotion markers
that referred to emotions implicitly or indirectly.
Regarding the context, most policy documents ana-
lyzed were addressed to the press or directly to policy
makers with the aim to (directly or indirectly through
media pressure) persuade policy makers to change their
Table 1. Documents of CSOs analyzed.
AI HRW IRC Greenpeace FoE EEB Total
Amount 86 46 30 50 50 5 267
Years 2015–16 2015–16 2015–17 2014–17 2014–17 2014–16 2012–17
Source: elaborated by the author.
1 The press releases and policy documents selected were the ones that CSOs themselves considered to fall within these themes (I used the search func-
tion and limited the search to these themes). Regarding the Facebook statuses, it was difficult to order them by topic since Facebook does not have a
search function.
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 4, Pages 103–114 106
course of action in the sense of the goals of the CSOs
under analysis. Facebook statuses have a much broader
audience, including CSO members and followers. This
data was triangulated with five semi-structured inter-
views with key players working for the direction or com-
munication department of the CSOs analyzed. In con-
trast to surveys, semi-structured in-depth interviews are
flexible. The emphasis is placed on how the interviewee
frames and understands issues and events. Since inter-
viewees are left to raise issues and frame them in their
own way, there is less risk of bias such as social desirabil-
ity bias. For example, instead of asking directly if CSOs
were employing a fear mongering or boosting strategy,
I engaged in a general discussion about the place of fear
in CSOs’ political communication.
The six environmental and human rights CSOs se-
lected are to be counted among the most well-known
EU-based CSOs. They are not only prominent members
of the EU umbrellas on their respective topics, such
as the Green 10 (environment) or the Human Rights
and Democracy Network (HRDN); they also interact fre-
quently with European policy makers. These CSOs are
quite similar to other well-established professionalized
EU-based CSOs. The selected CSOs differ in their rela-
tionships with their membership and in their relation-
ships with public authorities. While all CSOs under anal-
ysis have sufficient resources to make noise and make
news (Thrall, 2006), they are well-known for approach-
ing the media in rather different ways. This variation will
help understanding better the different effects of the log-
ics of influence, membership and media under analysis.
Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch
(HRW) and Greenpeace EU office are well-established
popular organizations getting most of their support from
their large number of donors and supporters. Organiza-
tions like AI and Greenpeace claim to reach a large num-
ber of members and supporters (7 million and 3 million
people respectively).With only 1,000 volunteers and am-
bassadors, the logic of membership is expected to play a
lesser role for HRW. HRW is however known to be an or-
ganization focused on getting media attention, and for
this reason, the media logic may play a relevant role.
Organizations such as Friends of the Earth (FoE), Inter-
national Rescue Committee (IRC) and European Environ-
mental Bureau (EEB) are funded by public bodies, namely
European institutions. For this reason, the logic of influ-
encemay unfold differently for these organizations. They
are expected to be less dependent on the logic of mem-
bership since their constituencies do not provide them
with the resources they need to operate. However, FoE
is known for its connections with social movements, and
in this sense, the logic of membership may play a rele-
vant role. Most CSOs have are very active on the topics
under analysis. Only EEB, well known for its work on top-
ics such as circular economy, had so far little opportunity
to focus on Climate change, which explains the reduced
number of press releases published on this topic. While
also a member of the HRDN, IRC can also be considered
as a humanitarian CSOsmore focused on service delivery
than on the publication of documents.
3. Rhetorical Appeals by EU-Based CSOs
In this empirical section I discuss the presence of appeals
to reason and appeals to emotion in the document anal-
ysis. I first present the results of the descriptive content
analysis showing the frequencies of the presence of emo-
tions in the different documents. Secondly the attention
is turned to the explanations provided in the analytical
framework: logic of influence, membership and media
logic. For a better understanding of the dynamics atwork,
and in-depth content analysis has been triangulatedwith
in-depth interviews and placed in context.
3.1. Complementarity between Rhetorical Appeals to
Emotions and Rhetorical Appeals to Reason
Data collected suggest that EU-based CSOs use both
rhetorical appeals to reason and emotion. Tables 2
and 3—displayed here for descriptive purposes—show
how frequently emotion and cognitive markers (as initial
indicators of appeals to reason and emotion) appeared in
the documents analyzed. These tables showing emotion
and cognitivemarkers should be understood as the tip of
the iceberg. CSOs analyzed also used other methods to
display emotions in their documents such as figures of
speech or expressive speech acts, including metaphors
and nomination strategies. While referring to emotional
content during the interviews, CSOs staff alsomentioned
storytelling, pictures, videos and examples.
Regarding cognitive markers, CSOs used logical argu-
mentation and reasoning which is not clearly reflected
in the Atlas.ti analysis. CSOs also back up their asser-
tions and statements with citations to authority, includ-
ing mainly international organizations, public authorities
and the press. CSOs have also commissioned surveys
by leading research companies or consultancies (Ipsos
Mori or Globe Scan) to support their points. More in-
terestingly, when the documentation is analyzed care-
fully, the distinction between emotions and facts is prob-
lematic. Indeed, most CSOs’ scientific reports and doc-
uments do not only report facts but they also report
the—often emotionally—charged testimonies of victims
and survivors.
Data show that the choice for expertise does not
necessarily imply the exclusion of emotions and feel-
ings. Preliminary research also shows that this finding
can be replicated among national and local CSOs such
as Secours Catholique and Cimade in France (Sanchez
Salgado, 2017). While these analysis show that emo-
tions and cognitive markers coexist, further research
could focus on collecting additional quantitative data to
establish to which extent these two types of appeals
are correlated.
Human Rights CSOs working on migrants used emo-
tion markers frequently (see Table 2). Another interest-
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Table 2. Human rights and humanitarian CSOs (refugee crisis).
Markers AI HRW Rescue Total
Emotion markers 83 (0.96)2 48 (1,04) 32 (1,06) 163
Compassion 6 (7,22%) 7 (14,58%) 4 (12,5%) 17 (10,42%)
Fear 22 (26,50%) 14 (29,17%) 4 (12,5%) 40 (24,54%)
Hate 7 (8,43%) 6 (12,5%) 0 (0%) 13 (7,97%)
Hope 12 (14,46%) 9 (18,75%) 9 (28,12%) 30 (18,40%)
Shame 16 (19,28%) 3 (6,25%) 2 (6,25%) 21 (12,88%)
Suffering 15 (18,07%) 5 (10,42%) 2 (6,25%) 22 (13,50%)
Others 5 (6,02%) 4 (8,33%) 11 (34,37%) 20 (12,27%)
Cognitive markers 78 (0,9) 34 (0,74) 20 (0,66) 132
Reason 6 (7,69%) 11 (32,35%) 3 (15%) 20 (15,15%)
Research 48 (61,54%) 19 (55,88%) 3 (15%) 70 (53,03%)
Statistics 11 (14,10%) 1 (2,94%) 5 (25%) 17 (12,88%)
Survey 7 (8,97%) 0 (0%) 5 (25%) 12 (9,09%)
Others 6 (7,69%) 3 (8,82%) 4 (20%) 13 (9,85%)
Source: elaborated by the author3.
Table 3. Environmental CSOs (climate change).
Greenpeace FoE EU EEB ALL
Emotions 16 (0,32) 59 (1,18) 2 (0,4) 77
Fear 2 (12,5%) 10 (16,9%) 0 (0%) 12(15,58%)
Hope 0 (0%) 12 (20,33%) 0 (0%) 12(15,58%)
Others 14 (87,5%) 37 (62,7%) 2 (100%) 53(68,83%)
Reason 20 (0,4) 30 (0,6) 3 (0,6) 50
Reason 2 (10%) 9 (30%) 1 (33,34%) 11 (22%)
Research 8 (40%) 11(36,66%) 2 (66,67%) 19 (38%)
Expert 8 (40%) 2 (6,67%) 0 (0%) 10 (20%)
Others 2 (10%) 8 (26,67%) 0 (0%) 10 (20%)
Source: elaborated by the author.
ing finding is that rhetorical appeals varied per policy
area since CSOs use different types of emotional and cog-
nitive markers. Compassion and shame were frequently
used by human rights CSOs, while they were almost ab-
sent in the documents published by environmental CSOs.
Data also showed that there are differences among CSOs,
which is particularly evident in the environmental policy
field. FoE used significantly more appeals to emotions in
the press releases than Greenpeace and EBB. The press
releases of these two last organizations are, as general
rule, much more technical. Having said this, emotional
or catchy expressions and metaphors were still used in
the titles, quotes of staff or campaigners.23
Table 4 confirms two main expectations: that there
are differences depending on the communication chan-
nel (and the audience targeted) and that there are differ-
ences depending on the type of CSO4. Since the nature of
press releases and of Facebook statuses is very different
(press releases contain more words), it is difficult to say
in which channel emotions are the most present. How-
ever, some CSOs, such as IRC used more emotions on
Facebook than on press releases (at least in comparison
with other CSOs). Themain finding is that environmental
CSOs displayed rather positive emotional messages on
Facebook and used regularly emojis.While hope and pos-
itive emotions are not absent, Human Rights NGOs also
used Facebook statuses to appeal to what are usually
considered as negative emotions. This is in line with their
strategy of requesting urgent action from their members
to place pressure on authorities responsible for human
rights violations.
3.2. Explaining the Use of Appeals to Emotions
All the factors mentioned highlighted by previous litera-
ture (logic of influence, logic of membership and media
logic) played a relevant role as expected. These factors
were combined in different ways and thus, CSOswere un-
2 To give an idea of the relative important of emotions I added the average number of markers per press release.
3 To avoid an excessively long table, only the emotion and cognitive markers that appeared more than 10 times have been included and the rest have
been placed in the others category.
4 Again, while interpreting the results of Table 4, it is important to keep in mind that emotional markers are just the tip of the iceberg when it refers to
the emotional content of Facebook statuses, since they often include pictures and videos.
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Table 4. Emotion markers in 50 last Facebook statuses 2017 (all topics included).
EEB FoE Greenpeace IRC AI HRW CSOsInternational
Sad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shame 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
Disturbing 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Fear 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Happy 3 2 1 3 1 0 10
Hope 2 1 1 4 2 1 11
Love 0 1 1 1 1 0 4
Passion 0 0 0 1 2 0 3
Sad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shame 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
EMO 5 4 3 14 9 3 38
Emoji 4 7 5 1 0 0 17
Source: elaborated by the author.
der contradictory pressures. On the one hand, policy offi-
cials (logic of influence) often imposed a discursive style
inwhich emotions had no place. On the other hand, CSOs
also believed that strong emotions were needed to show
that there was an urgent problem that required the at-
tention of their members and of the news (logic of mem-
bership and media logic).
As expected, the logic of influence led tomore techni-
cal and formal documents based on facts. The logics of in-
fluencewas particularly visible in the case of Greenpeace
EU office, because–contrary to the other organizations
analyzed–this Greenpeace office only addressed policy
makers. While communicating with the EU, especially
the Commission, Greenpeace did not put emotions in the
forefront. According to the Greenpeace representative:
In the European Commission is evident in the dis-
course: they use theword emotion to disqualify an op-
ponent, so if you say something they will say let’s not
get emotional or we are not dealing here with emo-
tions, we are dealing with facts…the attempt is to say
that what you say does not matter because that’s not
factual. That’s their approach, they have a very theo-
retical and analytical approach. (Interview 3)
While it may be less evident (since combined with other
logics), the logic of influence was also relevant for the
other CSOs. FoE, for example, considered that emotions
do not work when trying to influence policy makers like
the Commission but that they work when you try to
shape the public debate (Interview 1).
As expected, the logic of membership led to the pres-
ence of emotional content. FoE’s strong links with so-
cial movements seem to have contributed to the pres-
ence of emotional content in their political communica-
tion. The FoE representatives explained that their role
was to take grass-roots discussions to decision makers,
reach the public and inform the democratic debate (Inter-
view 1). EBB representatives also mentioned frequently
their democratic base, but due to their members’ lack of
resources, the logic of membership seemed less relevant
in the shaping of their communication strategy (Inter-
view 4). However, an increasing interest in addressing di-
rectly the public led the EBB to elaborate a new commu-
nication strategy with more space for emotional content.
All those interviewed, especially those working in
communication departments with a journalistic back-
ground, were well aware of the media logic. The em-
phasis was often placed on dynamics of personalization
with an emotional content. For example, on the topic
of the refugee crisis, AI would focus on families, since
all of us have families and this was expected to make
people feel empathy for refugees. Personalization and
the use emotions was also considered to be important
to appeal to a sense of humanity and compassion, as
well as to raise sympathy (Interviews 2 and 5). Adapta-
tion in terms of the dramatization bias was less clear.
Some CSOs representatives expressed reluctance to fo-
cus on dramatic negative stories, while others consid-
ered that you can create a drama effect without nec-
essarily focusing on the negative aspects of a situation.
All interviewees explained that their organizations in-
creasingly included in their communication strategies el-
ements that contribute to dramatization (Bennett, 2016)
such as videos, graphics, drawings and multimedia, etc.
Following this new way of presenting information, a CSO
representative even affirmed that they had been trans-
formed into a ‘journalistic organization’ (Interview 5). In-
terviewees also adapted to the media logic in more or-
ganizational (and not only content related ways). For ex-
ample, they emphasized the need to react quickly and
to write press releases in a way that would be the most
useful for journalists. At AI, to keep themedia pace, press
releaseswere evenwritten before events took placewith
several scenarios in mind (Interview 2).
The different logics (membership, media and influ-
ence) also depended on the issue at hand. Human Rights
CSOs working on refugees were more prone to use ap-
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peals to emotions in their communication strategies. In
the interviews, Human Rights CSOs affirmed than using
strong emotions was a way to humanize the issues so
the broader public and policy-makers could understand
that there is really an urgent problem that needs to be
addressed (Interviews 2 and 5). The FoE representative
interviewed thought that their focus on a justice and hu-
man rights perspective may explain why they used more
emotional content in their communication (Interview 1).
On top of this, the use of emotions in political communi-
cationmay bemore problematic for environmental CSOs.
In any case, environmental CSO representatives gener-
ally placed more emphasis on negative reactions from
policy-makers.
4. Emotional Appeals in CSOs’ Advocacy Strategies
Without being exhaustive, the next section shows how
appeals to emotions are used in CSOs’ advocacy strate-
gies. Based on the empirical material, the emotional ap-
peals that seemed to be themost frequent or relevant for
advocacy strategies were appeals to shame (blaming and
shaming strategy), appeals to fear (fear mongering strat-
egy) and appeals to hope and pride (boosting strategy).
4.1. The Complexity of Blaming and Shaming
The blaming and shaming strategy is clearly visible in the
case of the refugee crisis (Box 1). The explicit emotional
marker ‘shame’ appears 21 times in this issue, which is
much more than the average emotional and cognitive
marker (see Table 2). The word shame is mostly used
to refer to Europe or to the EU and its member states
(17 times out of 21).
When asked if they used a blaming or shaming strat-
egy, the representative of AI responded ‘of course we
use blaming and shaming, that’s our battle’ (Interview 2).
The HRW representative also confirmed that blaming
and shaming is just ‘what we do’ (Interview 5). Blaming
and shaming is thus a conscious strategy used systemati-
cally by the human rights CSOs analyzed. However, CSOs
representatives expressed some doubts about the use-
fulness of blaming and shaming in the new political con-
text since a new generation of populist politicians tended
to feel proud about facts that in other times would have
been perceived as shameful (Interview 2 and 5). Despite
these doubts, blaming and shaming continued to be con-
sidered one of the main strategies with overall positive
results when you looked at the broader picture.
In the environmental policy field the use of blaming
and shaming is not so evident while looking at emotion
markers alone. FoE is the only CSO that seems to visibly
engage in the blaming of policy makers through differ-
ent forms, includingwordsplay andmetaphors. Public au-
thorities are pictured as hypocrites (5 occurrences), dirty
(30 occurrences)5 and employing ‘shallow speeches’ or
referring to the ‘blatant emptiness of speeches’. Govern-
ments are also blamed using metaphors such as their
‘infatuation with gas’ and ‘plastic obsession’. FoE’s rep-
resentatives confirmed that they indeed used a blaming
and shaming strategy in a few occasions but that they
were very careful to place the blame accurately (e.g., on
a particular faction of the Parliament) to avoid feeding
discourses of the type all is the EU’s fault (Interview 1).
Greenpeace and EBB used blaming and shaming only
in specific cases, which can explain why this was not so
visible in their documents. The EBB representative af-
firmed that they used blaming and shaming sometimes,
but that they would think hard before because they did
not want to undermine their relationships with policy-
makers and business (Interview 4). Greenpeace EU of-
fice representative explained that they used blaming
and shaming, but only in very specific occasions and
with a very specific target and objective in mind (In-
Box 1. Examples of the use of emotion marker ‘shame’.
Before it was demolished at the end of October, the sprawling migrant camp in Calais had become a symbol of Europe’s
shame. (HRW, November 22, 2016)
European Union (EU) governments should hang their heads in shame at the ongoing reluctance of many to ensure
a collective and concerted search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean, said Amnesty International. (AI, 12
March 2015)
Europe’s response to the refugee crisis within its borders is shamefully inadequate. (IRC, November 4, 2015)
Box 2. Examples of blaming by environmental CSOs.
As the dirtiest kid in the European Union class, the Netherlands has also been neglecting its duty to combat climate
change for a long time. (FoE)
Greenpeace EU legal adviser Andrea Carta said: “The Commission is being spectacularly irresponsible: it’s allowing mas-
sive subsidies for a project backed by a government that openly challenges the importance of independent oversight
for nuclear safety”.
5 Most of the time dirty is used to refer to dirty energies such as coal, etc. However, FoE also uses the term dirty to refer to public authorities and
corporations.
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terview 3). For example, during the process of adop-
tion of the REACH directive, Greenpeace EU office pub-
lished a rather shocking picture where Commissioner
Gunter Verheugen could be seen feeding chemical prod-
ucts to a baby, while President Barroso looked passively.
This picture had a very specific purpose: to make other
Commission and EU officials feel ashamed about the
stand of Verheugen regarding this issue, including his
links with German industry. The caution of these two or-
ganizations in using blaming and shaming seemed well-
justified since they affirmed that when they used blam-
ing and shaming they usually got strong (even personal)
reactions from their targets.
4.2. Avoiding Fear Mongering? A Complex Balance
between Fear and Hope
While the emotion marker fear appeared quite fre-
quently in the documents of some CSOs under analysis,
this does not seem to be part of a strategy of fear mon-
gering (as previously defined). CSOs representatives in-
terviewed were conscious that fear was present in their
work, but they affirmed that they were not consciously
trying to spread fear. They insisted that what they were
sayingwas faithful to the truth and supported by facts. In
addition to this, the interviewed affirmed that they usu-
ally tried to downplay fear by focusing on more positive
and hopeful facts. This seems to be confirmed by the con-
tent analysis that shows—especially for environmental
CSOs—that the word marker hope is used as frequently
as the word marker fear.
CSOs working on the refugee crisis used the word
fear more frequently than environmental CSOs. When
using the word fear, human rights CSOs aimed at com-
bating the fear mongering strategy used by politicians,
rather than the contrary. The emotion ‘fear’ was indeed
frequently used to refer to public authorities (15 times).
CSOs would argue that current public policy towards mi-
grants is based on fear. Themajority of references to fear
referred however to the fear of refugees and migrants
and seemed to be directed to move readers and policy
makers to compassion rather than to spread fear itself.
While the use of the word marker fear by FoE does
not seem relevant6, when reading in-depth FoE’s press
releases, it could be eventually interpreted that they en-
gage occasionally in fear mongering using words such as
horrendous and devastating or metaphors such as ‘the
world is still on a collision course with climate change’.
Rather than fear mongering, this could also be inter-
preted as a faithful description of reality based on cur-
rent scientific evidence. FoE representatives considered
they were unfairly accused of fear mongering and be-
cause of this, they took special care of supporting their
arguments with data and facts. It could also be argued
that environmental organizations are actually refraining
themselves from spreading fear. Environmental CSOs
claimed that they did not share all the information they
had about the current situation regarding climate change
because thiswould give such a fearful picture that people
and policy-makers would fall in despair. Finding the right
balance between fear and hope seemed to be a concern
for CSOs representatives interviewed, but not always one
easy to solve:
I think we are also kind of aware that by raising fear
without giving directions to what the solution really
is can lead to all sorts of false solutions. You know,
putting blame in the wrong place and I am thinking
about some of the riots of the far right-wing populism
which is all about fear mongering but without telling
the genuine solution at all. (Interview 1)
4.3. Boosting: Encouraging Members to Promote
Change
In the documents analyzed, Greenpeace EU office
praises institutions or policy makers more frequently
than the rest of CSOs. Greenpeace representative af-
firmed that praising policy makers was done to be fair
(giving praise when it was deserved) rather than within
the context of a boosting strategy (Interview 3). This fair
play could also help Greenpeace to be heard when they
were more critical. Praising the EU was also related to
Greenpeace’s global assessment according to which the
EU, while having major problems, had very developed
environmental legislation compared to other countries.
Within this context, Greenpeace wanted to highlight the
positive role of the EU.
Box 3. Examples of use of emotion marker fear by CSOs.
Leaders need to be serious about identifying and removing people who pose a threat or who don’t need protection, but
they should not foment fears and prejudice that play into the hands of extremists and risk blinding host communities
to their common humanity. (HRW, March 4, 2016)
The EU needs to be responding not with fear and fences, but in the best tradition of the values it purports to hold dear.
(AI, November, 2015)
This is relevant in countries like Greece, where the fear is that refugees bring economic burden, but the reality could be
of benefit. (IRC, September, 2016)
6 Most occurrences were placed in a poem (7 occurrences) where the author was claiming not to be afraid.
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 4, Pages 103–114 111
Box 4. Examples of boosting.
Li Shuo, climate policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, said: “We are seeing much needed leadership emerge from the
EU and China today”. (Greenpeace, June, 2017)
A new plan by key members of the European Parliament would help the EU retake global leadership on climate change,
just as the US dithers on its commitments under the Paris climate agreement, said Greenpeace.
Sebastien Risso, Greenpeace EU forest policy director, said: “The Parliament is right to recognise the huge responsibil-
ity that the EU has to stop deforestation, and how important this is for climate action and sustainable development.
(Greenpeace, April, 2017)
Box 5. Examples of boosting directed to members (from Facebook).
Over the next year, you have the opportunity to make history. You’re going to help create the largest protected area on
Earth. (Greenpeace, Facebook post, December 29, 2017)
There’s an emerging, strong, diverse, inspiring movement coming together to demand that the transition from an ex-
tractive economy to a regenerative one is fair and fast. (FoE, November 29, 2017)
Your words have real power—the power to comfort, heal and even set people free. (AI, November 27, 2017)
While this did not appear very frequently in the docu-
ments analyzed, other CSO representatives also affirmed
that they praise the positive steps by public authorities
when they act as required. One might argue that orga-
nizations such as AI and HRW might—all in all—praise
policy makers as much as Greenpeace, but that in this
specific issue (refugee crisis) there were fewer occasions
to praise policy makers. According to a CSO representa-
tive (Interview 4) the European level did not seem the
most adapted for the application of a boosting strategy
because elections are not as relevant as at the national
level and because there were less opportunities to make
policy makers believe they would be remembered for
their legacy.
However, boosting members and the public in gen-
eral is part of the strategy of the CSOs analyzed and this is
mainly done throughnon-traditional channels of commu-
nication such as Facebook. In their communication, CSOs
are actively trying to empower citizens and tomake them
feel proud of doing something good for human rights or
the environment. CSOs also consciously celebrated their
victories and displayed the power of their network and
their movement.
5. Conclusion: Breaking Down the Emotional Paradox
This article has shown the important and ambiguous role
that emotions play in CSOs’ advocacy strategies. The de-
scriptive content analysis showed that CSOs tend to com-
bine the use of appeals to emotions with appeals to cog-
nition in their communication. The emphasis on emo-
tions depended on different factors such as the logics
of influence, the logics of membership and the media
logic. While the logics of influence led to less emotional
content, the logic of membership and the media logic
seemed to increase the emotional content in CSOs po-
litical communication.
CSOs are thus confronted to contradictory pressures.
On the one hand, activists know that politics is about
emotions and that they need strong emotional appeals
to make problems really matter. This translates in the
use of emotions in their communication and the use of
emotion-inspired advocacy strategies, such as blaming
and shaming. On the other hand, the perception that
emotional expression can be detrimental for rational and
objective decision-making is also prevalent among ac-
tivists. For this reason, activists tend to downplay cer-
tain emotions. This apparent paradox is supported by
the prejudice according towhich emotions interferewith
the proper functioning of rationality. If emotions were
recognized as an effective way to reach a rational view,
these two logics would be more consciously (and possi-
bly effectively) combined. The recognition of emotions
as a way to reach a rational view would also led to ques-
tion the current position of public authorities that rely
exclusively on cognition. It could also help promoting the
further exploration of the nuances of emotions in advo-
cacy strategies.
This research has also shown the relevance of emo-
tions in advocacy strategies. Blaming and shaming seems
to be a very relevant strategy for CSOs with many vari-
ants. Does blaming and shaming really intend to shame
policy makers (as suggested by the definition of this con-
cept) or does it rather intend to make them feel afraid
for their reputation? Do different types of blaming and
shaming have different effects? This article also showed
that CSOs do not seem to be aiming at spreading fear
within a framework of a fear-mongering strategy. It also
showed that managing fear in CSOs’ advocacy strategies
raises complex issues. Should CSOs share all the informa-
tion they have regarding the climate situation and hu-
man rights violations, even if this information may lead
to discouragement and despair?
Last but not least, this article also showed that a
clear boosting strategy does not seem to be systemati-
cally applied with policy makers. CSOs affirm they just
praise them occasionally to be fair and to increase their
credibility. CSOs are however greatly involved in promot-
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ing good feelings among their members and supporters.
Further research could analyze how effective boosting
is to get people more involved in the causes that CSOs
are defending.
These conclusions also raise important normative
questions. Is it acceptable to use blame or fear to in-
duce a change of behavior? While triggering fear to ma-
nipulate behaviour is generally—and probably rightly—
perceived as wrong, it seems reasonable—and probably
right—to inform policy makers of the consequences of
their actions. If these consequences are negative or dan-
gerous, fear may be needed to adopt the most adequate
policy solutions. Thus, while fear can certainly disrupt
politics and decision-making, it may also be a form ofwis-
dom in the face of real danger.
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